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We describe a comparative analysis of different tools used to assess safety-critical software
used in nuclear power plants. To enhance the credibility of safety assessments and to
optimize safety justification costs, Electricite de France (EDF) investigates the use of
methods and tools for source code semantic analysis, to obtain indisputable evidence and
help assessors focus on the most critical issues. EDF has been using the PolySpace tool for
more than 10 years. Currently, new industrial tools based on the same formal approach,
Abstract Interpretation, are available. Practical experimentation with these new tools
shows that the precision obtained on one of our shutdown systems software packages is
substantially improved. In the first part of this article, we present the analysis principles of
the tools used in our experimentation. In the second part, we present the main charac-
teristics of protection-system software, and why these characteristics are well adapted for
the new analysis tools. In the last part, we present an overview of the results and the
limitations of the tools.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
In 1999, the French Nuclear Safety Authority published a
Fundamental Safety Rule (RFS: Regle Fondamentale de Suˆrete)
applicable to safety systems' software. This document defines
the principles and requirements to be satisfied by the design,
implementation, installation, and operation of safety-critical
software. The French regulatory practice requires that
appropriate provisions be made to guarantee safe shutdown
of the reactor, long-term cooling of the fuel, and confinementfr.
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behaof radioactive products, under all realistic operating condi-
tions. For some requirements, the RFS proposes acceptable
practices.
One of these requirements is: “An analysis shall be per-
formed regarding the potential failures of a computer-based
system caused by a software fault and their consequences to
safety. The objective of this analysis is to verify that system
failures caused by software faults have no consequence to
safety”. One of the measures of the associated acceptable
practice consists of “identifying the various types of softwareCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
Lines ANSI C Code
1 x ¼ 1
2 while (x < 100) {
3 x ¼ x þ 1;
4 }
Lines Range calculation for variable x
1 Xð1Þ ¼ ½1; 1
2 Xð2Þ ¼ ðXð1Þ∪Xð3ÞÞ∩½∞; 99
3 Xð3Þ ¼ Xð2Þ þ ½1; 1
4 Xð4Þ ¼ ðXð1Þ∪Xð3ÞÞ∩½100;þ∞
Lines ANCI C Code Range calculation for variable x
1 x ¼ 1 Xð1Þ ¼ ½1; 1
2 while (x < 100) { Xð2Þ ¼ ½1; 99
3 x ¼ x þ 1; Xð3Þ ¼ ½2; 100
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 1 2e2 1 8 213faults to be considered (data outside allowable ranges, array
overflows, divisions by zero, etc.), regardless of the causes,
and in locating internal threats to the software, in other words
possibilities of occurrence of these types of faults, considering
the defensive programming used”.
The Research and Development Branch of Electricite de
France (EDF) investigates the use of methods and tools that
can provide indisputable proof regarding the nonoccurrence
of intrinsic run-time software faults, or that can help asses-
sors to focus on the more complex parts where the tools
cannot work by themselves. One of the investigated ap-
proaches is the semantic analysis of source code.
EDF has been using the PolySpace Verifier [1] tool for > 10
years to perform static analyses of protection system
software [2]. The results of the analyses are sent to the
Safety Authority as are others documents, as part of the
qualification process for safety critical systems. For software
aspects, EDF follows the IEC 60880 standard. The static
analysis complements the verification activities, mainly
based on test activities, done during the software life cycle.
EDF performs static analyses on refurbishment or software
evolution of existing protection systems, and is currently
performing theses analyses on the EPR Flamanville
protection system, Areva NP, La Defense/France.
Currently, new industrial tools based on the same formal
approach, Abstract Interpretation, are available, such as
Astree [3] and the plug-in Value Analysis of Frama-C [4]. This
article describes a practical experimentation with these three
tools, and shows that the precision obtained on one of our
shutdown systems software packages is substantially
improved, compared with PolySpace Verifier. We are now
able to provide formal evidence that this software, including
application and system parts, is free from intrinsic run-time
faults.
In the first part of this article, we present the tools used
in our experimentation, and Abstract Interpretation, the
underlying approach used by these tools. In the second part,
we present the main characteristics of protection-system
software, and why these characteristics are well adapted for
the new analysis tools. In the last part of this article, we
present an overview of the results and limitations of the
tools.4 } Xð4Þ ¼ ½100; 1002. Technical principles of tools
The semantic analysis of software consists of extracting in-
formation from its source code (e.g., C language) for the
following reasons: (1) to formally prove properties. (Specif-
ically, it ensures that a property is satisfied at the end or
during program execution.) and (2) to exhaustively check
possible intrinsic run-time errors (invalid arithmetic opera-
tions like division by zero, use of null pointers, out-of-bounds
array access or pointers) that could cause failure of the pro-
gram or error propagation throughout the system.
Because we only work with source code, this approach can
only detect intrinsic run-time errors. Functional errors due to
faulty specifications or requirements, or due to specification
misunderstanding, are not detected. For these kinds of errors,
we use testing approaches.2.1. Analysis principles: abstract interpretation
The semantic analysis tools that we evaluate in this article are
based on the Abstract Interpretation technique, introduced in
1977 [5].
This technique is based on the estimation of each variable's
range at all of its occurrences. With this information, it is
possible to formally check some types of run-time errors, such
as zero division, use of null pointers, out-of-bounds array
access or pointers, etc.
In practice, the tool overestimates the ranges by an itera-
tive process. The following example illustrates this approach.
For the variable x, X(i) denotes its range at the end of line
number i.The first calculation gives the equations to solve:The tool resolves these equations by an iterative process.
At the beginning all the ranges are empty. At the end the tool
converges to the following result:In this example, the tool formally proves that there is no
risk of overflow for the integer variable x. To increase the
precision of the analysis, an analyzer may adopt a much finer
modeling method than simple intervals (e.g., lists of intervals,
singular points, octagons, polyhedra, etc.).
Often, program variables are interdependent. In that case,
for each line of code, the analyzermay represent the ranges of
the variables by an n-dimensional geometrical shape; n being
the number of variables visible at this line, similar to an
octagonal or polyhedral abstract domain. With octagonal do-
mains, for code containing two interdependent variables, the
tool computes additional overestimates for x-y and xþy. For a
polyhedral abstract domain, the tool computes overestimates
of a.xþb.y, where a and b are constants chosen by the tool.
To illustrate this point consider the following example:
Table 1 e Correspondence of error type.
Frama-C PolySpace
This code is dead UNR
Division by zero ZDV
Accessing out of bounds index OBAI
Out of bounds write or read IDP
Accessing uninitialized left-value NIV/NIP
Overflow in float or integer (signed/unsigned) OVFL
Non terminating function NTC/NTL
Invalid RHS operand for shift SHF
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2 void octagon(void) {
3 int x,y;
4 float result;
5 if (random) {
6 x ¼ 5;
7 y ¼ 2; //polyhedral domain:x2f5g; y2f2g; x y2f3g
} else {
8 x ¼ 2;
9 y ¼ 5; //polyhedral domain: x2f2g; y2f5g;
x y2f3g
10 }
11 result ¼ 1/(x-y); // x2½2; 5; y2½5;2; x y2f3g
Without octagonal or polyhedral domains, the tool com-
putes the following interval overestimate at line 11:
x2½2;þ5; y2½5;þ2
In that case in line 11, the tool estimates that:
4  x y  10
and raises a warning that the division potentially has a null
denominator. By using octagonal domains, the tools merge
the previous sets of x-y, thereby maintaining more precision
for the value of x-y.
It is important to notice that this approach, by over-
estimating the variables ranges, can raise run-time errors that
are not achievable by real program execution. We call this a
false alarm. For instance, without using polyhedral domains,
tools can raise one false division by zero alarm at line 11 of the
previous example.
We can already note the following:
 The global variables (which are visible in every line of code)
systematically increase the dimensions of the geometrical
shapes, and increase the tool's analysis time.
 The tool's approximations lead to a loss of precision: A
diagnosis is “certain” either when all the elements of the
geometrical shape lead to an error or when they all lead to
an absence of error. However, a diagnosis is “uncertain”
when only a part of the geometrical shape leads to an
error.
2.2. Results given by the PolySpace tool
After control flow analysis and abstract interpretation calcu-
lations, PolySpace Verifier gives the following results: (UNR)
unreachable code or function; (ZDV) division by zero; (OBAI)
out-of-bound array access or reference through incorrect
pointer (IDP); use of noninitialized variable (NIV) or pointer
(NIP); (OVFL) overflow/underflow of floating point or integer
variable; (NTC) nonterminating function call; (NTL) nonter-
minating loop; and (SHF) shift operator check.
These checks are shown in the program's source with the
following color code: red for guaranteed error; green for
guaranteed absence of error; orange for “uncertain” diag-
nostic; and gray for unreachable code.
In addition to the checks, the user can examine the ab-
stract domain calculated by the tool. Although the tool usesdifferent types of abstract domains, the results are displayed
as intervals. This information is important for the user. It al-
lows him or her to understand the origin of orange di-
agnostics, which are often due to overapproximations of
variables' ranges by the tool.2.3. Results given by the Frama-C tool
Frama-C is a modular static analysis framework for the C
language. Within this framework, a number of plug-ins offer
different kinds of static analysis. For our experimentation, we
mainly use the plug-in value that uses Abstract Interpretation
to compute sets of possible variable values for analyzed
software.
Prior to analysis, the tool performs a number of local
transformations in the normalization phase. These trans-
formations aim at making further work easier for the ana-
lyzers. Analyses usually take place on the normalized version
of the source code. Normalization results in a program that is
semantically equivalent to the original one but that uses fewer
instruction types (e.g., all loops are transformed into while
loops).
The results given by Frama-C are written directly in the
simplified source code as assertions generated by the
analyzer, but only potential or proven errors are given (red and
orange results from the PolySpace tool). The unreachable code
is highlighted in orange. In comparison with the PolySpace
tool, Frama-C does not explicitly signal green diagnostics.
The error types covered by Frama-C (and described in Table
1) are similar to those of PolySpace.
In addition, Frama-C generates an assertion for pointer
comparison. This assertion warns that in the C language, the
comparison of variable addresses may vary from one compi-
lation to another, such as &a < &b or &x < 0x600,000. We will
detail this point later.
As with PolySpace, the user can examine the sets of values
for each variable at each point of the analyzed software. These
sets are discrete values or intervals. However, unlike Poly-
Space, Frama-C does not use sophisticated abstract domains
such as polyhedra.
In the objective of proving the absence of error, the user
has to add specific assertions to help the analyzer to prove
generated assertions, or the user has to argue that these
generated assertions are due to the analyzer's over-
approximation. For this purpose, we used the plug-in scope to
compute information about dependencies on specific vari-
ables selected by the user (e.g., statements that contribute to
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user).3. Presentation of the case study
3.1. System architecture
For our experimentation, we analyzed a prerelease version of
the software of a refurbished nuclear power plant (NPP)
shutdown system. This system is computer based and is one
of themost critical systems in an NPP. These systemsmust be
simple in order to obtain a high level of confidence.
Rolls Royce Civil Nuclear developed the Instrumentation &
Control (I&C) system and Operating System (OS) software, and
AREVA NP will develop the application software.
The software has no interruptions and is a sequential
infinite loop composed of the following steps: (1) self-moni-
toring; (2) cycle time management; (3) data acquisition; (4)
application processing; (5) data output; and (6) local terminal
management.
The system is composed of three types of electronic board.
(1) One digital processing module: This card runs the OS and
the application software. (2) Different kinds of signal input/
outputmodules: These cards are connected to digital or analog
sensors or actuators, and they do not contain embedded soft-
ware. (3) Communication module: This card has specific
embedded system software. Depending of the system's global
architecture, several communication modules can be plugged
into one processing module. The interface between OS and
communication modules is done by dual port RAM.
Depending on the function being implemented in the sys-
tem, the designer selects the relevant signal input/output
boards, and the necessary number of communication
modules.
The application's C code is automatically generated from
graphical diagrams. The OS is directly programmed in ANSI C.
For our experimentation, as it was a prerelease of the OS,
we did not have the final application software. Instead, we
used the system supplier's application software developed to
test the system.
The interface between the generic OS software, commu-
nication software, and specific application software is done by
global variables initialized by C code and assembly code. To
increase the analysis' precision, we stubbed these assembly
files.
3.2. Why safety critical software is well adapted to static
analysis
For the NPP, the main design rule for safety critical software is
simplicity. In our example, the software is sequential, has no
multitasking, nor interrupt processing.
The compiler's behavior and the options used are well
known. The full source code of the software to be analyzed is
available, and is relatively small. For our case study, the size of
the system software is approximately 17,000 lines of C code
(loc), and 22,000 loc for the application software. The memory
mapping is known; this point is important andwill be detailed
in the Results section.The software, especially system software, is close to
hardware and generic (i.e., has to manage all possible hard-
ware input/output configurations). The main difficulties for
the software are the following: (1) it uses pointers to absolute
addresses; (2) it manages pointers as integers by casting.; and
(3) self-tests are divided into several slices over several
sequential loops. At each loop, the lastmemory address tested
is stored in a global variable. So, the domain value of these
variables consumes computer resources, or introduces
imprecision by overapproximation.
The system/application interface has to be generic, and
uses large, structured global variables that could be a source of
inaccuracy.4. Analysis of the shutdown system
4.1. Analysis preparation
All the evaluated tools analyze C source code. Parts of the
source code are in assembler. We analyzed each of them and
wrote stub functions or initialization for some of them to in-
crease the analysis' accuracy.
For example, the system's network configuration is defined
in an assembler file. This file declares and defines global var-
iables used in the C code.
During analysis, we also modified some parts of the C code
to increase the analysis' scope. For example, the system soft-
warewaits ina loop forvalue changes inahardware register, or
reads values from communication registers. In these cases,we
had to model this access as reading a “volatile” C variable.
4.2. Analysis optimization
The tools Astree and Frama-C propose analysis options to
customize analysis. These options require a good under-
standing of how the tool works, but they significantly increase
the analysis accuracy.
In particular, the static analysis of loop instructions, ar-
rays, or structured variables is often a source of
overapproximation.
4.3. Loop unrolling
For Frama-C, the option “slevel n” indicates that the analyzer
is allowed to separate, at each point of the analyzed code, up
to n states from different execution paths before starting to
compute the union of said states. An effect of this option is
that the states corresponding to the first n iterations in the
loop remain separated, as if the loop had been unrolled. This
option also improves analysis accuracy of code containing
multiple paths, as illustrated in the following C code:
1 void multiple_path(int *fct_ok, int *status) {
2 int var_loc;
3 int fct_oki ¼ 1;
4
5 if (random)
6 var_loc ¼ 12;
7 else
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9 if (fct_oki ¼¼ 1)
10 var_loc þ ¼ 12; //non initialization assertion generated
11 if (fct_oki ¼¼ 1)
12 *status ¼ var_loc;
13 *fct_ok ¼ fct_oki;
14 return;
15 }
As long as the “slevel” is < 3, the tool generates a non-
initialization assertion in line 10, when reading var_loc.
Indeed, if the tool cannot separate more than one state, the
output of the first if instruction (line 9) will merge the different
intermediate states, and lose the relation between variables:
fct oki ¼ 10var loc ¼ 12
Thus, the tool stores only the state:
fct oki2f0; 1gandðvar loc ¼ 12 or non_initializedÞ
We mainly use this option to improve analysis precision.
The option can be global or adapted to the scope of a C
function.
This unrolling loop option can also be found in the Astree
tool.4.4. Controlling abstract domain precision
As introduced in the “Results given by the Frama-C tool”
section, the abstract domains used by Frama-C are either sets
of discrete values or intervals. An option manages the
threshold at which a set of discrete values is approximated by
an interval. This option could reduce the number of false as-
sertions but needs more computer resources.
Another option is used to indicate the number of array cells
that the tool can distinguish. Above the user-set limit, all the
cells' abstract domains are merged, causing approximation.
This option was useful for our case study, as the source code
uses large arrays for system configuration purposes.4.5. User assertions
Another way to improve precision or prove formally the
absence of error is to use user assertions. All the tools evalu-
ated have this function.
During analysis, the tool evaluates the truth value of the
user assertion. If it cannot prove the assertion, an alarm is
raised and the tool continues along the analysis path consid-
ering the assertion to be true.
We use user assertions as hypotheses concerning the
environment of the software, but also to indirectly prove as-
sertions generated by the tool.
To illustrate the first use of user assertions, the analyzed
case study has a serial link to a terminal. From this link, we
can send data to the critical system. The system software
reads from a 16-bits hardware register (given by absolute
address) the number of bytes of received messages. However,
messages sent by the terminal are limited to 256 bytes, so we
added a user assertion to avoid generation of “out-of-bound”
assertions by the tool.The other use of assertions as ameans of indirect evidence
is as follows. Frama-C is currently limited in interprocedural
analysis. The following example illustrates this limitation.
volatile int random;
void test_chemin(int * fonction_ok, int * retour) {int var_loc;
int fonction_oki ¼ 1;
if (random)
var_loc ¼ 12;
else
fonction_oki ¼ 0;
if (fonction_oki ¼¼ 1) var_loc þ¼ 12;
if (fonction_oki ¼ ¼ 1) *retour ¼ var_loc;
*fonction_ok ¼ fonction_oki;
/* Assertion proved by Frama-C */
//@ assert *fonction_ok ¼ ¼ 1 ¼ ¼>/initialized(retour);
return;
}
void main () {
int my_fonction_ok;
int my_retour;
test_chemin(&my_fonction_ok, &my_retour);
if (my_fonction_ok ¼¼ 1)
// useofnoninitializedvariable generatedbyFrama-C
my_retourþþ;
}
In the example, Frama-C proves the user assertion at the
end of the function. But at return to the caller main function,
the Frama-C states are merged, and the dependency infor-
mation between fonction_ok and initialization of variable
my_retour is lost.
For this point, the PolySpace tool better manages this
dependence, because it colored in green the use of the my_r-
etour variable.5. Results
We used the same case study, with the same code trans-
formation just described, with three static analysis tools:
PolySpace Verifier, Frama-C, and Astree. For Astree tool, the
evaluation was done in the short 30-day free trial period.
The versions used are as follows: PolySpace R2011a, Frama-
C fluorine 3, and Astree Version 13.04.
The analysis time was about 1 hour on a standard worksta-
tion for the three tools. In the end, we noted the number of po-
tential errors that have to be checked by the user. These are the
number of orange diagnostics for PolySpace, assertions to prove
for Frama-C, and alarms emitted for Astree. PolySpace gave 995
orange diagnostics and eight red diagnostics (concerning
voluntary unsigned overflows), Frama-C generated 153 asser-
tions to prove, andAstree emitted127 alarms. ForAstree,wedid
not generate alarms for noninitialized variables because the
evaluated version had a known “bug”which gave too imprecise
results. Thus, an accurate tool will raise fewer potential false
errors, as illustrated in Chapter “Analysis principles: abstract
interpretation”. The Abstract Interpretation theory guaranties
that no real faults, of the type checked, are missed by the tool.
Fig. 1 e Diagnostics distribution.
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ForPolySpace, theexcessofNIVand IDPchecks ismainlydue
to the fact that the system software uses a lot of pointers to
absolute addresses. For PolySpace, both reading from and
writing to an absolute address leads to warning checks on the
pointerdereference.Anabsoluteaddress is consideredavolatile
variable.An in-depthanalysisof the results shows thataccess to
absolute addresses generated129 IDP checksand77NIVchecks.
Frama-C manages absolute addresses as global variables.
The user has to specify a range of valid addresses. This is
possible with the analyzed software, because we have the
memory mapping of the executable code. With this informa-
tion, we also guarantee that there is no interference between
global C variables and access to absolute addresses.
However, Frama-C cannot consider an absolute address as
a volatile variable. To model access to a hardware register, we
had to modify the source code. Astree goes further in man-
aging absolute addresses: for each address the user can
associate a C type and define if it is a volatile cell or a previ-
ously defined global variable. This information is used to
detect if there is an index overflow when accessing an array
defined by an absolute address, and reduces the generated
alarms by Frama-C when comparing two global variables or a
variable with an absolute address.
The number of diagnostics given by PolySpace and the
limited means to understand where an overapproximation
has been done by the analyzer prevent us from analyzing each
of them.
With Frama-C, we analyzed each assertion to prove. For
each,we could: (1) confirm that it was a real bug; (2) justify that
the tool was not able to conclude; or (3) justify that the tool
made an overapproximation.
For instance, a large number of invalid dereference and
out-of-bounds index assertions are located in modules thatmanage communication between the protection system and
the user console. The protection system receives messages
through a serial link. The message cannot exceed 1,024 bytes.
The beginning of the message packet gives its actual size in
bytes, and the two last bytes store the Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC) for integrity checking. Upon receipt of a message,
the system checks its integrity by computing the CRC and
comparing the result with that of the message. After this
checking, the software uses the message header to directly
access arrays, without checking if the value being read ex-
ceeds 1,024 bytes. As we modeled the receiving buffer as a
volatile variable, the header was overapproximated.
We did not analyze each of the alarms emitted by Astree,
because the objective was only to position this tool relative to
the other tools.6. Conclusion and perspectives
During the analysis of the case study software, we highlighted
five bugs and one robustness recommendation to the supplier.
As the software was under development, the supplier
confirmed the bugs. These were found independently by the
supplier in testing phases.
This experimentation with the Frama-C tool allowed us to
justify all the remaining assertions. Up to now, with the Poly-
Space tool, we could achieve this goal only in the application
software. The number of orange diagnostics in the system
softwarewas too high to justify each of them.We are now able
to provide formal evidence that this software, including
application and system parts, is free from intrinsic run-time
faults. Based on this experimentation, EDF has chosen to use
the Frama-C tool to analyze the software of a refurbished
protection system for the 1300 MWe NPP in France.
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Frama-C tool with regard to identified weaknesses: improved
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